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STOCK OPTIONS

TWO-CONTRACT ANALYSIS MAY IMPERIL STOCK
OPTION PLANS
James

F. Ward*

TOCK option plans generally have withstood judicial scrutiny where
they have complied with the requirements developed to control
the operation of this type of arrangement. It would seem, therefore,
that the future of stock options is secure against even the most critical
court review-that nothing in the nature of the stock option arrangement would render it vulnerable to a general attack. The writer believes
that complacency in this assumption is not now advisable. Recently a
view (from a respectable authority) has been introduced unnoticed
into this area, and may have gained the acceptance accorded to an
unsuspected imposter. This view, when analyzed for its logical implications, actually challenges the basic premise of the stock option arrangement. None of the recent considerable commentary on stock options
seems to refer to this opinion which the writer believes to be a substantial error in fundamental analysis perpetrated in an important decision,
and followed without consideration in other cases. This article will
examine some of the implications of the erroneous analysis employed in
Gottlieb 11. Heyden Chemical Corporation.1
The Gottlieb case is frequently discussed as standing for the proposition that there must be a fair balance between the value of stock
options granted to key employees and the value received in turn by the
corporation, or optionor. The merit of this pronouncement seems to be
generally conceded. This rule, with its attendant problems, has been
given so much attention that the argument set forth in the second
rehearing2 stands unnoted in other decisions and legal writings.
The plan in the Gottlieb case entitled participating employees to
exercise their options to purchase stock at different future times. The
optionee was required to remain in the employ of the corporation a
minimum period of time before he could exercise his option. The price
at which the option was exercisable was 95 percent of the market
price of the shares at the time of the granting of the option. The
Delaware Supreme Court refused to grant summary judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that whether the corporation received sufficient consideration under the option arrangement was a question for the lower
court's determination. The court noted that the important question was
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Del. (1952) 92 A. (2d) 594; other opinions in same case at 90 A. (2d) 660 (1952);
91 A. (2d) 57 (1952); (Del. Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 507.
2 (Del. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 594 at 596-597.
1
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whether the retention of the employee's services could be fairly exchanged for the options granted-whether there was a reasonable balance between the value of the consideration moving from each side.3
It is this question that has provoked most of the recent commentary. 4 The Delaware court, however, further analyzed stock option
plans in a manner which might sometime cause considerable difficulty.
The corporation argued that the court was precluded from investigating
the adequacy of the consideration given for the stock to be issued
under the option. This argument was based on a Delaware statute
which was presented as providing that stock may be issued for cash,
property, and labor done and that, in the absence of actual fraud, the
directors' judgment as to the value of such consideration shall be conclusive.5 In other words, according to the defendant, if the statute
permits certain things to constitute consideration for the purchase
of stock, and makes conclusive the board's judgment as to the value
of the things named, then a court lacks authority to determine whether
such consideration received by a corporation has value which can be
reasonably related to the value of the stock given in exchange. Apparently embarrassed by this argument, the court-relying more upon
orthodoxy than upon analysis-said that stock option arrangements
must be represented by two separate contracts. First, the court noted
that there is an option contract, which is an agreement to keep open
for a specific period an offer to sell at a particular price. Second,
the court observed that there may be a purchase and sale of stock,
which would be represented by a separate purchase contract entered
into at the time the option is exercised. The court then reasoned
_that the option contract and the purchase contract each must possess
its own consideration, that each must be able to stand on its own
consideration. 6 The court then held that the statutory provision in
a (Del. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 57 at 58-59 (first rehearing).
See 5 FLETCHER, CYc, CoRP., perm. ed., §2143.1 (1952) (Cum. Supp. 1953) which
collects many articles on this point.
5 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §152 providing: "Subscriptions to, or the purchase
of, the capital stock of any corporation organized under this Code or any other law of this
State may be paid for, wholly or partly, by cash, by labor done, by personal prop~, or
by real property or leases thereof; and the stock so issued shall be declared and taken to
be full paid stock and not liable to any further call, nor shall the holder thereof be liable
for any further payments under the provisions of this chapter. In the absence of actual
fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors, as to the value of such labor, property, real estate or leases thereof, shall be conclusive."
6 "Defendant has failed to acknowledge the difference between a continuing offer to
sell and an agreement to keep that continuing offer open for a specific term without charging .
the price. What we have to consider, of course, are two contracts, not one. There is an
4
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question concerns the consideration supporting the purchase contract,
and not that supporting the option contract. The court further held
that the optionee's agreement to remain in the service of the corporation for a specific time before becoming entitled to exercise his option
was consideration which supported the option contract.7 Consequently,
the court's reasoning allowed it to investigate the sufficiency of the
retention of service consideration, for this was held to be unrelated
to the purchase contract, and the purchase contract was held to be
the only concern of the statute.
To separate a stock option plan into an agreement to keep an
offer open and an agreement of purchase seems to conform to orthodox
reasoning in the option field generally, and orthodoxy is seldom disturbing. In the area of stock options, however, reflection shows the
above analysis to be inept. The two-contract approach in the Gottlieb
case may render stock options incompatible with basic principles of
contract and corporation law. Thus where the two-contract approach
is employed, stock option plans may run the risk of being declared
invalid.
CoN'I'R.AcT LAw

If a stock option arrangement is considered as two contracts and
"each of these contracts must, of course, possess its own consideration," 8
it behooves us to examine the nature of the consideration supporting
each supposedly separate contract. The Delaware court conveniently
omitted an adequate examination on this point. The Gottlieb opinion
requires us to allocate the retention of the services of the employee as
part of the consideration which supports the option contract,9 it being
remembered that the employee must remain with the corporation
until the option is exercised. What other consideration supports the
option contract? The Gottlieb case as well as other pertinent decisions
hold that there must be a reasonable relationship between the value
of the option granted and the value of the services which the employee
option contract, and there may be a purchase and sale of stock. Each of these contracts
must, of course, possess its own consideration." Emphasis added. Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Corp., (Del. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 594 at 597.
7 "Careful consideration of this matter, therefore, brings us back precisely to our fust
view. Retention of services is here intended to be the consideration for the option contract,
and cannot be passed off simply as the price of the stock so as to bring it within the fust
paragraph of this statute." Emphasis added. Id. at 598.
s Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 594 at 597.
9 Id. at 598.
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must render before the option is exercisable.10 Therefore, it necessarily follows that the value of the option granted is also consideration
which underlies the option contract as distinguished from the purchase contract. This is so since the value of the option granted must
be fairly equated to the value of the retained services which, as has
been said, Gottlieb allocates exclusively to the option contract. The
only other consideration possibly applicable to the option contract is
the time element inherent in every option agreement. 11 If the time
element were considered, it of course would be represented in the
corporation's agreement to keep its purchase offer open for a specific
period.
Following the Gottlieb analysis, we now have strained the option
contract of all its consideration. From the optionee moves retention
of services; from the corporation moves the value of the option plus
perhaps the time element. Although euphemism may be present in
the preceding sentence, reason is elsewhere. Value of the option to
the employee cannot lightly be passed off as consideration moving
from the corporation in the option contract, exclusive of the purchase
contract. As this point will be referred to later, it will only briefly
be noted here. The' real value of the option is represented by the
discount advantage to the optionee, i.e., the difference between the
option price and the market price of the stock at the time the option
is exercised.12 This value cannot be definitely known at the time
the so-called option agreement is entered into, and hence it cannot
be considered without reference to the purchase contract. As a matter
of fact it may turn out to be nonexistent.13 Since it must be estimated
with reference to events which will occur after the so-called option
contract is entered into, and since there must be a reasonable relationship between this value and the value of the services, there is strong
10 Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 125; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 57; Kerbs v. California Eastern
Airways, (Del. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 652; Kaufman v. Shoenberg, (Del. Ch. 1952) 91 A.
(2d) 786; Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co. (of New Jersey), 23 N.J.S. 431, 92 A. (2d) 862
(1952), affd. 12 N.J. 467, 97 A. (2d) 437 (1953).
11 The time element was not discussed in the Gottlieb opinion. It should be noted
that the beginning of the period during which the optionee has the right to purchase shares
is usually delayed until he has remained in service the stipulated time. In this respect the
stock option is different from the usual option agreement wherein the time during which
the option is exercisable begins to run immediately.
12 See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 507; Kaufman v. Shoenberg, (Del. Ch. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 786.
13 That is, the market price of the shares may not have risen, or may have declined,
so that at the time the option is exercisable there may be no discount advantage or option
value available to the optionee.
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reason to consider the entire option arrangement in its totality, as
one contract, and to abolish the two-contract analysis. This conviction of the writer will be further demonstrated with reference to
the several problems presented by the two-contract analysis.
Passing to the purchase contract we :find our inquiry about consideration uncovers considerable difficulty. It is clear that consideration for the purchase contract cannot be found in the option contract.14 Consequently, we must exclude from consideration eligible
for the purchase contract all that which Gottlieb requires us to allocate to the option contract. Therefore, the consideration represented
by retention of the employee's services and by the value of the option,
or the discount advantage to the optionee, cannot be deemed applicable to the purchase contract. What then is left for this agreement?
On the part of the corporation there is a transfer of stock to the optionee. In return there is a transfer of cash from the optionee. No
other consideration is discernible.
It is very doubtful whether this exchange of cash for stock will
support the purchase contract in all cases that may arise. The usual
purchase price of an option plan is 95 percent of the stock's market
value at the time of the granting of the option, as was the case in
the Heyden Chemical plan. We may assume for purposes of discussion that the market price as of this time is $100. If the market
price remained constant until the so-called separate purchase agreement was consummated, the optionee would receive $100 in stock
for every $95 he was entitled to present to the corporation. If we
assume that over the period of the option the market price of the
stock increased, as is always the hope and often the case,115 then if
the increase were 50 percent, $95 would be exchanged for $150 worth
of stock acquired by the optionee. If the plan in question permitted
any key employee to avail himself of 10,000 shares, it may be seen
that the discrepancy between value given and value received, or the
14 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 594 at 597; Durfee
House Furnishing Co. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 100 Vt. 204 at 208, 136 A. 379 (1927).
Cf. Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. (2d) 158, 88 P. (2d) 698 (1939);
Tate v. Murphy, 202 Okla. 671, 217 P. (2d) 177 (1949); Washington Realty Co. v.
Saad, 139 Wash. 704, 247 P. IO (1926). It should be observed that although one consideration in a contract may sustain a number of promises, including an option provision,
this does not mean that the consideration in an option contract may, if considered separate
from the contemplated purchase contract, lend any support to the purchase contract.
15 If this were not the likelihood there would be no point in stock options, for none
would ever be exercised. See Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 343 at
350 where it was said: "The advance in value of the shares was clearly the hope and
expectation of all the parties and such advance cannot, of and by itself, and under the
present circumstances, make the exercise of the option invalid."
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advantage to the optionee, would amount to $550,000.16 The history
of stock option plans shows that the foregoing assumptions cannot be
considered unwarranted or improbable.1 7 It will be recalled that
this $550,000 increment to the employee could to no extent be justified by virtue of his agreement to remain, or the fact of his remaining,
an employee for a specific period, since retention of these services
has already been relegated to the previous and completely separate
and distinct option contract. How then may the execution of this
purchase contract, with its concomitant $550,000 advantage to the
employee, be justified? Would such a gross discrepancy of consideration render the purchase contract invalid according to established
principles of contract law?
Although courts generally do not feel qualified to investigate the
adequacy or sufficiency of consideration behind contracts, agreements
will be declared invalid where the consideration is of the same nature
as the thing promised but is equal or smaller in amount-where, for
instance, a given sum of money is promised in exchange for a smaller
amount of money.18 The reason for this exception to the general
rule which presumes the adequacy of consideration is that under the
circumstances of the exception it is simply impossible for the law to
indulge in the presumption of a reasonable equivalence of consideration.19 Furthermore, a substantial variance in the considerations
for any· given agreement has often been held to demonstrate proof of
fraud which will void the agreement. 20 It is important to inquire
16 $150 less $95, multiplied by 10,000 shares.

11 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639
(option made 12,000 shares available to executive); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, (Del. Ch.
1952) 91 A. (2d) 786 (maximum shares to any one executive under plan was 10,000);
Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co. (of New Jersey), 23 N.J.S. 431, 92 A. (2d) 862 (1952)
(option plan limited each director to 8,000 shares a year and a total of 24,000 shares during
the entire period of the plan); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 103 (1942), affd. without opinion, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 412, affd. 292 N.Y. 552, 54 N.E. (2d)
683 (1944) (option entitled executive to buy 25,000 shares); Diamond v. Davis, supra
(stock increased from $20 to $50); Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 343
(stock increased from $1 to over $11).
18 American University v. Todd, 9 Harr. (Del.) 449, 1 A. (2d) 595 (1938); I
WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., §115 (1936).
19 lbid.
20Byers v. Surget, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 303 (1856), where the Court said, at 311,
" ••• it is insisted that inadequacy of consideration, singly, cannot amount to proof of fraud.
This position, however, is scarcely reconcilable with the qualification annexed to it by the
courts, namely, unless such inadequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience; for this
qualification implies necessarily the affirmation, that if the inadequacy be of a nature so
gross as to shock the conscience, it will amount to proof of fraud." See Stiefler v. McCullough, 97 Ind. App. 123, 174 N.E. 823 (1931); Olson v. Rasmussen, 304 Mich. 639, 8
N.W. (2d) 668 (1943); Vondera v. Chapman, 352 Mo. 1034, 180 S.W. (2d) 704 (1944);
l CoBBIN, CONTRACTS §127 (1950).
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whether the above hypothetical, but not unrealistic, circumstances
attending the exercise of a purchase contract will permit the agreement to survive the tests relating to adequacy of consideration. First,
it is obvious that a corporation's granting $550,000 more in value to
an employee than it receives from the employee constitutes a very
substantial discrepancy in consideration. It hardly would be surprising if the $550,000 discount advantage-which might be accorded
the employee only a year after the option was granted21 -were held
to be so inequitable as to amount to proof of fraud. 22 Secondly, not
only is the purchase contract susceptible of being considered fraudulent, but also it may well be held to come within the exception to
the rule against examining adequacy of consideration. Since the
purchase agreement calls for an exchange of cash for stock, can it
be said that the nature of the thing promised (stock) is sufficiently
dissimilar from the nature of the consideration given (cash) as to
preclude a court's inquiry into the adequacy of the consideration?
Viewed realistically, the nature of cash and that of a stock which is
traded frequently on, let us say, the New York stock exchange is
extremely similar for purposes of the rule. 23 This is so for the stock
will almost always be readily convertible into cash, and consequently
only a short step away from cash itself. Assume the quite possible
circumstance of a tender by the optionee of $95 in cash when the
stock had increased from $100 to $150. The optionee would then
have about 58 percent more in stock value than he parted with in
cash. Immediately thereafter the stock could be converted into money.
During the moments between the time of the exercise of the option
and the time of the conversion of the stock into cash the stock could,
of course, B.uctuate in price. However, a decline in the proportion
of $55 during these few moments is so unlikely as not to warrant
serious concern. The point is that the stock received by the optionee
may be so nearly equivalent to money as to be considered of the same
nature as money for purposes of the exception. This would be particularly true where a substantial discrepancy obtained between the
value of the stock and the amount of money involved, where the discount advantage was very great. It bears repeating to note that a
substantial discrepancy in value may not be justified by showing that
21 It is usual for a stock option to become exercisable, at least in part, a year after it has
been granted.
22 See note 20 supra.
23 The less liquid the stock the less likelihood there would be of an application of the
exception to the rule concerning adequacy of consideration. The shares of most publicly
owned corporations, however, have a high degree of liquidity.
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the corporation benefited by much more than the mere receipt of the
optionee's purchase price--that the corporation also received valuable.
continued services of its key employees with. the concomitant intangible benefit of having select employees become part owners in
the business. Gottlieb forbids this. Furthermore, if we are forced
to accept the two-contract analysis, we are bound by the established
principle that the adequacy and fairness of consideration must be
ascertained at the time the contract in question is entered into.24
Hence there is additional reason why there may be no relation back
to the option contract for the purpose of borrowing consideration.
One cannot read the Gottlieb case, as well as other stock option
decisions, without becoming acutely aware that in this area courts
are keenly desirous that there be an equitable relationship between
the consideration moving from each side. The statements in the
cases25 unmistakably reveal that reasonably sufficient consideration
must be given the corporation in return for the shares which it has
issued. This interest in requiring a fair balance between what the
corporation is to part with and what it is to receive would certainly
have led the Delaware court to examine the purchase contract in
this respect had not the court felt precluded from doing so. The
court was confronted with the following statutory provision: " . . .
the purchase price of . . . capital stock . . . may be paid for . . .
by cash, by labor done, by personal property, or by real property or
leases thereof; and the stock so issued shall be . . . taken to be full
paid stock. . . . In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction,
the judgment of the directors, as to the value of such labor, property,
real estate or leases thereof, shall be conclusive."26 It was held that
this statute gave wide discretion to directors in establishing value relationships in the purchase contract, and therefore immunized the
agreement from judicial scrutiny on this question. 27
24 Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. (2d) 158, 88 P. (2d) 698
(1939); Tate v. Murphy, 202 Okla. 671, 217 P. (2d) 177 (1949); Washington Realty
Co. v. Saad, 139 Wash. 704, 247 P. 10 (1926).
2!> Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp 125; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 57; Kerbs v. California Eastern
Airways, (Del. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 652; Kaufman v. Shoenberg, (Del. Ch. 1952) 91 A.
(2d) 786; Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co. (of New Jersey), 23 N.J.S. 431, 92 A. (2d) 862
(1952), affd. 12 N.J. 467, 97 A. (2d) 437 (1953).
20 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §152.
27 "While . . • this statute would, in the absence of fraud, operate to make the judgment of the directors final as to the purchase price of stock, nothing in the statute purports
to make their judgment in respect to the consideration for an option conclusive in" the
absence of fraud or on any other terms." Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. 1952)
92 A. (2d) 594 at 598.
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The writer is convinced that, if this statute had not been pressed
to show that the question of relative values should not be investigated,
the court would not have artificially separated the option contract
from the purchase contract. Since it was intent upon reviewing the
fairness of the bargain, the court was happy to make use of the
orthodox separation so as to confine the operation of the statute to
the actual exchange of money for stock. In this way the propriety
of the arrangement could be subject to review without appearing to
do violence to an embarrassing statute. It is believed that, absent
this statute, the Gottlieb case would have inquired whether the value
of the optionee's services plus the option price could fairly be related
to the present value of the possible discount advantage which might
later accrue to the optionee.28 If it can be demonstrated that this
statute does not have the meaning forced upon the Delaware court,
•the way may be cleared for a more realistic view of stock options.
It will be observed that the statute permits stock to be issued for
cash, property, labor done, etc. However, it makes the directors' judgment as to the value of the considerations named conclusive except
as to one consideration so listed. Although, in absence of actual fraud,
the board's judgment regarding the value of property received, labor
done, etc. is said to be final, the statute clearly says nothing about
the conclusiveness of its judgment regarding the value of cash received in exchange for stock.29 Obviously, it could not so provide.
The value of cash is not subject to differences of judgment. Consequently, insofar as cash is received, the fair intendment of the
statute is that all stock must be issued for its actual cash value. If,
therefore, the so-called purchase contract is separated from the entire
context of the option arrangement, we may have $95 in cash exchanged for $150 in stock. The statute not only omits to bring this
type of transaction within the conclusive discretion of the directors,30
but also condemns it by strong implication. Consequently, in seeking
28 As will later be shown, this is what the court actually did.
In relating the
employment factor to the option's value, or the discount advantage to the optionee, the
court was comparing elements in each so-called separate contract with each other.
29 The directors' judgment is only conclusive as to ". • • the value of such labor,
property, real estate or leases thereof ••• ," therefore, by obvious inference, it is not conclusive where cash is the consideration. Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §152.
so If the option arrangement is viewed from the beginning as one entity, cash will
not, of course, be the only consideration to be exchanged for the stock. The employee's
services must also be considered. Because the statute in question is inoperative where cash
alone is involved, can we say that it is also inoperative where a combination of cash and
future services constitutes the consideration? If it is not completely inoperative in this
situation, at least it should not be applied to preclude all examination of the arrangement
in the-absence of actual fraud. In the first place, cash should have some, if not complete,
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to avoid the statute the court actually induces its fatal effect; whereas
if no plan of circumvention were devised, the provision would be
quite harmless. It is also worthy of note that substantially identical
provisions in other corporation acts have nevertheless been construed
to permit judicial examination of the stock-property value relationship in similar cases. 31
The recent case of Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp. 32 may be
noted here in support of the opinion that the statute considered in
the Gottlieb case was misconstrued. The Bennett opinion, decided
by the Delaware chancery court, concerned motions to dismiss a complaint which sought to cancel outstanding stock issued pursuant to
the exercise of stock rights. In denying the motions to dismiss, the
court was forced to dispose of defendant's argument that th~ statute
in question made the directors' judgment as to the value of the shares
issued conclusive, and therefore that the court could not review this
question. The court held this law not to apply for the reason that
"that Section deals with the judgment of the directors as to the value
of property received for stock. Our case involves the value of stock
issued for cash."33 In lending its authority to the interpretation that
cash as consideration renders the statute inoperative, the chancery
court in the Bennett case disregards the Gottlieb opinion wherein the
supreme court held that, in the absence of actual fraud, the statute
gives the directors an unrestricted license to determine the purchase
price of stock under the typical option plan where cash is a consideration involved.34 It is this strained view that forced the supreme
court into its artificial and unsound analysis.
Although the Gottlieb opinion is strongly on record as advocating
the two-contract approach to stock options, it is submitted that in
reality no such analysis is employed. Actually, the option arrangement is treated as an inseparable agreement. If, as many courts have
held, 35 the value of the optionee's services must bear a reasonable
sterilizing effect upon the statute's application to stock options. Secondly, the statute concerns ''labor done" and consequently the provision should not apply where the plan is
tested as of its initiation when the services are not "done," but remain to be done.
31 Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926), affd.
15 Del. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927); accord: Conley v. Hunt, 94 Conn. 551, 109 A. 887
(1920); DeShelter v. American S.W. Supply Co., 182 ID. App. 403 (1913).
32 (Del. Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 236.
33 Id. at 240.
34 See note 27 supra.
35 See note 10 supra.
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relation to the possible discount advantage, then the so-called option
and purchase contracts cannot be considered distinct from each other.
The discount advantage can be found only by estimating the gross
value which the stock may be expected to attain when the option is
exercised, and subtracting therefrom the optionee's purchase price.
The purchase price and the future value of the shares are both factors
of the so-called purchase contract. The employee service factor is
relegated to the so-called option contract. To relate these factors
requires the option aspect of the arrangement to be compared with
the purchase aspect. Thus to balance services against option value
is to view the option arrangement in its entirety and as one entity.
The Gottlieb declarations concerning an option and a purchase contract are designed to avoid a supposed but nonexistent impediment
in the above noted statute. Even though these utterances did not
result in a basic conclusion different from that which would have
obtained under more appropriate analysis, they are by no means harmless. If this two-contract approach is followed by other courts there
is substantial risk that sometime it will be pursued to its logical consequence of invalidating stock options. Up to date no decision which
has relied upon the Gottlieb precedent has adopted its contractual
schizophrenia.
Several courts have recognized the impossibility of precisely appraising a stock option's value as of the time it is granted. The
impossibility arises because the option's value is dependent upon the
price level of the stock at the time the option is exercised. Courts,
however, are satisfied with a reasonable approximation of the discount
advantage in lieu of a precise measurement.36 The chancery court
to which the Gottlieb case was remanded recently said on remand:
"Thus it becomes impossible as a practical matter to comply with
the . . . direction of the Supreme Court if it be construed to require
the making of such a valuation" (for the option). 37 The lower court
then interpreted the supreme court as giving it "the right to consider
value relationships without fixing a dollar and cents figure on every
element. All one can do is see whether the results appear to be
shocking in the light of the total picture."38 It is indeed revealing
36 Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 343 at 350; Kaufman v. Shoenberg, (Del. Ch. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 786 at 794; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del.
Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 507 at 511.
37 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 507 at 511.
38 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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that even the Delaware chancery court notes the impossibility of
treating an option plan as being composed of two separate and distinct contracts, and indicates that all elements of the entire plan (or
the "total picture") must be considered together as being interrelated.
It is believed that in the stock option £.eld conventional analysis
has been misapplied. It is true that much orthodox reasoning tells
us that there is inherent in the very definition of an option two contracts, an initial option agreement and a later purchase agreement if
the option is exercised. 89 It is submitted, however, that the advent
of stock options introduced a new type of option agreement which
requires a re-examination of option analysis. 4 ° Corbin tells us that
even an ordinary type of option agreement need not be considered
as two distinct contracts. He considers the situation of an option to
buy, whereby in consideration for $100 paid, A promises B to convey
Blackacre for $5,000 at B's option, to be exercised within thirty days.
Corbin notes:
''There is, therefore, a difference between the legal effect
of a notice of acceptance of a revocable offer and the effect of
the notice given by B in exercising his contractual option. The
former notice has the greater effect of the two-it makes the only
contract that there is. The later notice does not make a new
contract-it merely pushes an already existing contractual obligation one step further along its way, turning the duty of A
that was conditional on notice into a duty that is no longer condi...:u.ona.l "41
Corbin further points out that the type of option into which a stock
option arrangement probably falls is really a conditional contract to
sell.42 He asserts that the conditional contract to sell which is in
the nature of an option, and a formal option agreement are identical
in their legal operation.48 Durfee House Furnishing Co. v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co. also is explicit authority for viewing option arrange89 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §61 (1936).
40 It is not the purpose of this article to discuss fully the doctrinal analysis of stock
options. A breach of the employee's promise to remain in service, or a refusal by the corporation to issue the prescribed stock when the employee has met all the conditions imposed
upon him, etc., are problems outside the scope of this paper. It is here intended only to
demonstrate the harm of the Gottlieb approach.
41 1 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrrs §264 (1950). Emphasis added.
42Corbin, "Option Contracts," 23 YALB L.J. 641 (1914).
48 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §262 (1950).
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ments as being constituted by only one contract.44 Other cases also
refer to options as becoming single contracts when, and only when,
the options are exercised.45 It is unnecessary to extend discussion
into the technical nature of an option. Beyond doubt a stock option
is unique46 and requires the initial opti~n aspect and the final purchase aspect of the arrangement to be considered together.47 All
that is important is that comparison of these aspects is possible under
some acceptable analysis. The two-contract analysis is wholly unacceptable because of the likelihood that the so-called purchase contract will be void.
CORPORATION LAW

Executive Compensation

The two-contract analysis encounters more difficulties than just
those found in contract law. It also renders the purchase contract
vulnerable under principles of corporation law. Well-established
principle requires that the amount of executive reward bear a reasonable relationship to the services which are performed by the executive. 48 As has been seen, however, the fact of the employee's re44 Durfee House Furnishing Co. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 100 Vt. 204 at 208, 136
A. 379 at 381 (1927). Although McGuirk v. Ward, 115 Vt. 221, 55 A. (2d) 610 (1947),
appears to overrule the Durfee case in its view that option agreements consist of only one
contract, the McGuirk case should not be so interpreted. The McGuirk decision only
clarifies the meaning of the Durfee case, and accepts this meaning as follows: "Thus it is
apparent that all that is meant in that [Durfee] case is that an option is not a completed
contract to sell and convey until acceptance." McGuirk v. Ward, supra, at 223.
45 Taylor v. Hartman, 370 Pa. 146 at 148, 87 A. (2d) 785 (1952); Phillips v. Tetzner,
357 Pa. 43 at 45, 53 A. (2d) 129 (1947). See Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 103 at
112-113 (1942), affd. 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 412, affd. 292 N.Y. 552, 54
N.E. (2d) 683 (1944).
46 Stock options, unlike ordinary options, have as a fundamental purpose the making
available to the optionee a substantial tax advantage. They are conceived in something less
than an atmosphere of arm's length bargaining. See Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co. (of New
Jersey), 23 N.J.S. 431 at 437, 446, 92 A. (2d) 862 (1952), affd. 12 N.J. 467, 97 A. (2d)
437 (1953). The option period of a stock option is usually postponed, whereas there is
no such delay in the ordinary option agreement. See note 1 i supra.
47 Otherwise the optionee's services could not be equated with the option's value or
the discount advantage.
48 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 731 (1933) (quoting with approval at
pages 591-592 part of Judge Swan's dissenting opinion in lower court); Holthusen v.
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 125 at 129; Wyles v. Campbell,
(D.C. Del. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 343 at 349; Nemser v. Aviation Corp., (D.C. Del. 1942)
47 F. Supp. 515 at 517; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., (Del. Ch. 1953) 99 A.
(2d) 507 at 511; Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., (Del. Ch. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 311
at 321; Gallin v. National City Bank of New York, 152 Misc. 679 at 703, 273 N.Y.S. 87
(1934).

862

MmmGAN LAW R.Evmw

[ Vol. 52

maining in service, or his agreement to remain, has been allocated
exclusively to the option contract by the Gottlieb case. If, under
the not unlikely hypothesis mentioned above, a $550,000 reward
should go to the employee in the exercise of his purchase contract,
this substantial benefit could not even partially be justified as a quid
pro quo for the employee's having remained in service. How, then,
could such a sizeable reward survive the executive compensation test?
In order to uphold any substantial benefit arising out of the purchase contract, it is obvious that the compensation must be equitable
in relation to the employee's services. Part of the reward, which we
have assumed is $550,000, may be used to offset the difference, if
any, between what the optionee actually receives in salary and the
very maximum which his services are worth. This, of course, presumes that he is being underpaid. 49 It is inconceivable that a court
would find that the optionee was being underpaid in any amount
approaching $550,000. Consequently, most of this discount advantage would have to be equitably balanced against the optionee's agreement to remain with the corporation, an agreement which may possess
large value independent of the value of his actual services.50 But to·
strike such a balance would be to fuse the option and purchase contracts into a single arrangement. This is as it should be.
49 It should be noted that the Delaware chancery court indicates that some intangible
part of the discount ·advantage may be balanced against the additional assiduity which
may be presumed to come from the option recipient. The court says, "But in any event,
additional incentive compensation may be justified as a means of 'insuring' continued maximum effort." The court also says that, in receiving the tax advantage, the optionee receives
a type of compensation conducive of greater incentive. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
(Del. Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 507 at 509. Although an option may have the effect of
spurring the zeal of the optionee, the additional effort hardly will be worth more than a
fraction of a really sizable discount advantage.
50 Some plans, such as that considered in the Gottlieb case, do not require the optionee
to agree to remain in service. They provide that if the employee remains in service for a
specified period, then he may exercise the option. This distinction is only one of form,
being perhaps the difference between a unilateral and a bilateral arrangement. That the·
optionee, who has remained in reliance upon the option, has not specifically promised to do
so should not mean that he has not benefited the corporation over and above the value of
the actual services he has rendered. It can be said that his remaining was induced by the
original offer, and therefore the corporation gained continuance of his services which it might
not otherwise have had.
An additional comment might be made with reference to the size of the discount
advantage, most of which must be balanced against the optionee's remaining in service or
his promise to remain. If the optionee is entitled to exercise his option at a price which
is $55 less than the current market price, the corporation is not disposing of the stock at
$55 less than it could otherwise obtain for it. This is so because, if the corporation made
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Assets

If the discount advantage in the purchase contract cannot be
sustained as executive compensation, the option is, of course, subject
to the claim that it amounts to a waste of corporate assets. The ramifications of this consequence deserve separate attention. Obviously,
a corporation may not dispose of an asset the value of which is greatly
in excess of the consideration received in exchange therefor.51 This
is especially true when the asset is disposed of to the corporation's
management.52 As has been shown, the statute confronting the Delaware court in the Gottlieb case probably means that a corporation must
receive full, actual value in return for stock which is issued for cash,
as distinguished from labor done, personal or real property, etc. Hence
this provision may well be a statutory requirement which complements
the familiar common law rule concerning the wasting of corporate
assets.
Aside from this argument concerning the intent of the statute
when cash is received, this type of statute may not give directors as
wide a latitude of discretion as it appears to. If this is true, the statute
need not embarrass a court in its effort to ascertain whether directors
abused their discretion by issuing stock for property of less than commensurate value. Consequently, this provision need provoke no artificial analysis which would separate a stock option plan into two contracts, with only one being subject to the statute. Bodell v. General
Gas & Electric Corporation53 concerned a somewhat similar statute in
its application to the issuance of no par stock, and, incidentally, was
a public offering of the stock, it would have to offer the shares at something less than
market price. Otherwise there might be little public acceptance of the offering. Furthermore, investment banker's commissions, legal fees, etc. would also make the net to the
corporation less than the market price. Hence, from the corporation's viewpoint, the discount advantage must be considered as something less than the difference between the
market price and the option price at the time the option is exercised.
51Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486
(1923); Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926),
affd. 15 Del. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927); Dean, ''Employee Stock Options," 66 HAB.v. L.
R.Ev. 1403 at 1422 (1953).
5 2 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 731 (1933); Nemser v. Aviation Corp.,
(D.C. Del. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 515; Gallin v. National City Bank of New York, 152 Misc.
679, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (1934); Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., (Del. Ch. 1952)
92 A. (2d) 311.
53 Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926), affd.
15 Del. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927).
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decided and affirmed by the Delaware chancery and supreme courts,
respectively. The chancery court noted:
"Notwithstanding therefore the absolute terms in which the
power of the directors of this corporation to fix the price at which
its unissued stock may be sold is expressed, equity will nevertheless by an analogy to that reasoning which underlies the doctrine
of preemptive right interfere to protect existing stockholders from
an unjustified impairment of the values underlying their present
holdings, where it is proposed by the directors to fix the consideration . . . for new shares of the no par value type."54
The same type of statutory provision55 was considered at length in
Holcombe 11. Trenton White City Co.56 Instead of giving a wide
latitude of discretion to directors "in the absence of actual fraud," the
statute was held not to preclude judicial review of the value question
where there is a substantial discrepancy between the value of the
property received and the stock issued. Quite apart from the element
of fraud the court said, "It must be apparent, however, even to the
casual observer, that a solemnly expressed judgment of the board of
directors of a corporation cannot impart value to property which has
no value."57 It was further observed-again without regard to evidence of fraud-that, "In an issue of corporate stock for property
purchased, and property taken over at a grossly excessive valuation,
the stockholders are, nevertheless, entitled to have creclited to the
payment of stock the just and fair value of the property conveyed to,
and services rendered for, the company, and for which stock was
issued."58 The Holcombe case quotes extensively from Donald 11.
American Smelting & Refining Co. 59 to the effect that the provision
in question does not restrain judicial review of value relationships
before stock is actually issued, but that after issuance only fraud will
54Jd. at 131.
55 Holcombe v.

Trenton White City Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 122, 82 A. 618 (1912) quoting,
at page 136, the pertinent part of the statute as follows: "'Any corporation ••• may purchase • • • property necessary for its business, and issue stock to the amount of the value
thereof in payment therefor, and the stock so issued shall be full paid stock and not liable
to any further call, neither shall the holder thereof be liable for any further payment under
any of the provisions of this act; and in the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the
judgment of the directors as to the value of the property purchased shall be conclusive.' "
56 Holcombe v. Trenton White City Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 122, 82 A. 618 (1912).
57 Id. at 136.
58 Id. at 147.
59 62 N.J. Eq. 729, 48 A. 771 (1901).
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permit the courts to open up the transaction for inquiry. 60 The Holcombe opinion then demonstrates that the Donald language which,
in the absence of fraud, would foreclose a valuation inquiry after
issuance of the stock is mere dicta, and of very doubtful merit. 61 The
Holcombe case concludes that, certainly where creditors are asserting
claims, the statute does not immunize from judicial scrutiny a contemplated or a completed transfer of stock for property; and it probably has little or no restraining effect in a suit merely between stockholders, even where the transfer has been completed. This decision
is also noteworthy for its holding that the statute is simply declarative
of the common law of New Jersey. 62
It has been held that if, whether due to fraud, accident, or mistake,
stock is issued in Illinois for property of less value than the stock, a
liability will arise in the amount of the deficiency.63 This rule was
last announced several years before the enactment in Illinois of the
Delaware type of statute. 64 However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Illinois courts will permit this act to emasculate the
common law rule that stock must be issued for its fair value,65 notwithstanding the absence of fraud in the transaction. This common
law rule is too closely allied with the traditional judicial prerogative
of preventing the wasting of corporate assets to be easily relinquished.
Moreover, even those who would construe this type of statute in its
most unalterable literal sense, and who therefore would require a
showing of fraud as a condition precedent to judicial review, are
confronted with the proposition that a substantial inadequacy of con60 Holcombe v. Trenton White City Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 122 at 137-138, 82 A. 618
(1912).
61Jd. at 139-140.
62 The instant statute is "merely a declarative enactment of what was and had been
the settled law and policy of this state." Id. at 141-142.
63 DeShelter v. American S.W. Supply Co., 182 ill. App. 403 (1913).
64ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 32, §157.18.
65 There is much language in both opinions and statutes which requires stock to be
issued for a consideration in the amount of its fair value, but which refers only to no par
stock. The implication is that stock with a par value need be issued for only its par value,
irrespective of its actual market value. This type of thinking represents a most unfortunate
lack of understanding of corporate affairs. If no par stock should be issued for its fair
value, there is utterly no reason why stock with a par value of $5 should be issued for this
price when its fair market value is $100. Concerning the necessity of receiving consideration equal to the fair value of the stock issued, see Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.,
15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926), affd. 15 Del. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927) (no par
shares); McClanahan v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 303 Ky. 739, 199 S.W. (2d) 127 (1947)
(par shares); Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W. (2d) 620 (1946).
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sideration is, itself, proof of fraud. 66 Hence it is submitted that the
Gottlieb type of statute does not preclude comparison of the value
of all the considerations exchanged in a stock option arrangement.
The fact that no discretion is intended to be given where cash is a
consideration, and the fact that a substantial discrepancy may constitute fraud, and the fact that courts restrict the force of this provision, are all reasons why it should not operate to prevent an examination into whether there is a reasonable balance of consideration.
The provision should not induce stock option plans to be viewed as
something other than single, inseparable entities.
Recent Statutory Developments
And Conclusion
The Delaware court has put itself on record that the above statute
removes the purchase aspect of stock options from judicial review.
As long as it can find two contracts and make the option aspect available for examination the court no doubt feels that it can keep the
important balance-of-values question within its purview. But to insist upon this separation may bring into play the insurmountable
problems discussed above. Moreover, in view of a recent amendment
to the Delaware code, the position taken by the court completely frees
both aspects of every stock option arrangement from judicial scrutiny,
unless actual fraud be proved. At the time of the Gottlieb decision
another similar provision of the Delaware statute permitted a corporation to issue stock options, and provided that the purchase price of
the shares could be fixed by the board. Effective July 8, 1953, however, this statute was amended to provide that the directors not only
could fix the purchase price of the shares, but also could fix the price
at which "any such rights or options may be issued. . . ." 67 The
case of Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp. makes it clear that the July
66Byers v. Surget, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 303 (1856); Stieff.er v. McCullough, 97 Ind.
App. 123, 174 N.E. 823 (1931); Olsen v. Rasmussen, 304 Mich. 639, 8 N.W. (2d) 668
(1943); Vondera v. Chapman, 352 Mo. 1034, 180 S.W. (2d) 704 (1944); see 1 CoRBIN,
CoNTRACTs §127 (1950).
67 The italicized portion of the following provision indicates that part which was added
to the existing statute by the amendment of July 8, 1953: " ••• every corporation may •••
issue ••• options entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the corporation any shares
of its capital stock. ••• The terms upon which, the time or times, which may be :\united
or unlimited in duration, at or within which, and the price or prices at which any such
rights or options. may be issued and any such shares may be purchased from the corporation upon the exercise of any such right or option shall be such as shall be fixed • • • by
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amendment refers to the value placed upon stock rights and stock
options.68 Furthermore, the amendment added a sentence to the
effect that the directors' judgment was conclusive in the absence of
actual fraud. This sentence contains language identical to the wording
which the Gottlieb case interpreted as shielding the so-called purchase
contract against investigation. Hence, under this recent amendment,
the option aspect of stock option arrangements is governed by the
same language which the Delaware Supreme Court has construed
as granting the purchase contract immunity from judicial review.
Under the Gottlieb analysis and interpretation, therefore, both the
so-called option contract and the so-called purchase contract are no
longer fit subjects of the court's jurisdiction. Barring actual fraud,
stock options become free from restraint!
As a practical matter such a consequence will never result. It
is highly unlikely that the Delaware court will remove itself from
this important segment of corporation law. Furthermore there is no
reason why it should. As has been indicated, statutes of the type in
question have been, and should be, construed so as not to impede
the proper judicial function of settling allegations that there have been
abuses of director discretion. Like Delaware, Montana also has recently added a new stock option provision to its corporation statute.
However, the pertinent part of this provision is almost identical to
the corresponding section of the Delaware law relating to the fixing
of the purchase price of shares. 69 Consequently, the Montana amendment presents no problems beyond the supposed difficulties which
have been discussed in connection with the Delaware statute.
The stock option has become increasingly important in the scheme
of corporate executive compensation. It is a unique type of option
the board of directors.•.• In the absence af actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment
of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options and the
sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive• •••" Del. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 8, §157.
Since the statute, before amendment, gave directors the right to fu: the price at which shares
may be purchased under option agreements, the amendment dealing with the price at which
"options may be issued" must refer to the option aspect of such an arrangement. The amendment is some evidence that the Delaware legislature has accepted the Gottlieb approach.
Ch. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 236 at 240.
corporation ••• has power: ••• 10.(B) To .•• grant ••• options •••
entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the corporation any shares of its capital stock
••• and the price or prices at which, any such shares ••. may be purchased upon the exercise of any such right or option •.. may be fixed ••. by the board.••." Mont. Rev.
Code (Supp. 1953) §15,801-IO(B).
68 (Del.
69 "Any
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arrangement, and requires an analysis which recognizes its special
characteristics. Assuming there is merit to the two-contract analysis,
clearly the value of this approach is limited to the ordinary option
agreement. To apply two-contract reasoning to stock options is to
undermine the foundation of this well-established vehicle of potential
compensation. It is hoped that the cloud on the future of stock options will be lifted by the substitution of a more suitable analysis.

